The Proper Role of Discretion in
Political Asylum Determinations
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This article analyzes the limits of discretion in asylum adjudications. The author describes the recent administrative jurisprudence concerning discretion;jurisprudence that is expanding, in
part, because of the 1984 Supreme Court decision in INS v.
Stevic. Reported and unreported Board of Immigration Appeals
cases are described and analyzed. Also analyzed are the permissible limits of administrative discretion under the Refugee Act of
1980 and international law, including the Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees and customary international legal principles respecting family reunification. The "refugee-in-orbit" phenomenon
resulting from discretionary denials of asylum is also discussed.
The article concludes that an unprincipled expansion ,of the role of
discretion in asylum cases could threaten the right to apply for asylum in the United States.
INTRODUCTION

An alien in the United States "may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General"' if the alien is determined to be a
"refugee." 2 Refugee status is available to persons who have been
persecuted or who have "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
*
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group, or political opinion." '3
Despite findings that they are "refugees" who would face persecution upon return to their home countries, with increasing frequency
asylum applicants are being denied asylum as a matter of discretion.
The discretionary character of asylum, particularly as opposed to the
mandatory character of withholding of deportation,' was emphasized
5
in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Court in
Stevic held that the refugee standard - "well-founded fear of persecution" - did not apply to the immigration remedy of withholding
of deportation. 6 Rather, the Court ruled that the prior administrative
clear probability standard obtained - "whether it is more likely
than not that the alien would be subject to persecution." '7 This result
was compelled, according to the Court, by the language of the statute and legislative history.
The Court began its analysis with the language of the withholding
statute:
[T]he text of the statute simply does not specify how great a possibility of
persecution must exist to qualify the alien for withholding of deportation.
To the extent that such a standard can be inferred from the bare language
of the provision, it appears that a likelihood of persecution is required8

The Court found persuasive the fact that the section literally provides for withholding of deportation only if the life or freedom of the
alien "would [not 'might' or 'could'] be threatened in the home
country, and the fact that the withholding provision, both prior to
and after amendment, makes no mention of the term 'refugee.' "
The Court, in its textual analysis, distinguished the withholding
provision from requests for discretionary asylum, which incorporate
the refugee definition and well-founded fear of persecution standard. 10 While expressly eschewing the opportunity to discuss the
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
5. 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984). The withholding remedy is available in exclusion as
well as deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1982).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
7. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2498.
8. Id. at 2497.

9. Id. Of course, a different result could have been justified by focusing on the
term "threatened, which also appears in the provision, as indicative of the fact that it
would be necessary to show but a "reasonable possibility" that the alien would be persecuted upon return to the home country - a standard suggested by Justice Stevens in the
asylum context, in order to qualify for withholding of deportation. Sometimes the "plain
meaning" of statutory language is in the eye of the beholder.

10. Id. at 2499. The Board of Immigration Appeals recently
probability of persecution standard to asylum as well as withholding claims.
Interim Dec. 2986 (BIA March 1, 1985). In Acosta, the Board recognized
eral courts have split on the refugee standard of question. It is likely that
Court will soon need to resolve the issue.
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meaning of the well-founded fear standard, the Court characterized
as moderate the notion "that so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will
probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a
reasonable possibility."' 1 The emphasis on the "discretionary" character of asylum, however, was apparent.
Following a denial of asylum as a matter of discretion, there are
sometimes efforts to deport the refugees to countries through which
they transited on their way to the United States. The unwillingness
typically demonstrated by these intermediary countries to re-accept
the refugees, however, raises a haunting spectre: a perpetual and indefinite shuttle to and fro; or even worse, return to the home countries to face persecution.
This article discusses the development, in published and unpublished decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, of the role of
,discretion in political asylum, and the bases upon which asylum may
be denied as a matter of discretion. Also discussed are principles
which may limit the exercise of discretion in the area, and selected
issues which are likely to be the subject of litigation on behalf of
asylum seekers who suffer discretionary denials.
THE

Salim

DECISION

Despite the precatory nature of the language of the asylum statute,12 it was not until 1982, in In re Salim,'13 that the Board of Immigration Appeals articulated the concept of discretionary asylum.
In that case, the Board held that a refugee could be denied political
asylum as a matter of discretion on the ground that he or she had
engaged in fraud in obtaining an invalid travel document (passport
and/or visa), and circumvented the overseas refugee admission process by coming directly to the United States rather than applying
abroad for refugee status. Salim involved an appeal from a denial by
the immigration judge of the alien's applications for asylum 14 and
temporary withholding of deportation.' 5 Excludability had been conceded on the grounds of fraud 16 and lack of valid travel documents.' 7
To appreciate the holding, and its rationale, a brief examination of
11.

Id. at 2498.

12.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) and 1158 (1982).
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982).
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the facts of Salim is necessary.
Mr. Salim arrived in the United States from Pakistan in February
of 1982 with the passport of another. He had purchased the passport
in order to obtain a visa to the United States as a non-immigrant
visitor for business.18 Mr. Salim was placed under exclusion proceedings; he subsequently applied for political asylum and withholding of
deportation. The State Department Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) issued an advisory opinion in connection with the applications, stating that Mr. Salim had established
a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan.
At the evidentiary hearing on the asylum claim, Mr. Salim testified that he had been affiliated with the Mujahdeen freedom fighters
in Kandahar, and that two of his brothers had been arrested by the
Soviet-controlled regime for similar activities. Another brother was
taken into custody by Russian troops at Kandahar, and his fate was
unknown. After refusing to join the Soviet-controlled Afghan army
in its war against the freedom fighters, Mr. Salim fled Afghanistan.
The immigration judge denied both asylum and withholding of deportation.19 The Board, however, noted that the State Department
opinion supporting Mr. Salim's contention that he will be persecuted
in his native country should be given significant weight, and held
that he "has established a well-founded fear of persecution despite
the immigration judge's conclusion to the contrary." A grant of
withholding of deportation was therefore mandated.20
The Board ruled, however, that a grant of asylum was not required. Referring to the language in the asylum statute which states
that an alien "may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General," 21 the Board drew a distinction between asylum and
withholding. While a finding on the question of persecution under
the withholding statute "is also binding on the issue of persecution
for the purposes of asylum," 2 it only established, according to the
Board, statutory eligibility for asylum. The Board had not previously
considered the exercise of discretion in an asylum case where it was
found that the alien would be persecuted if returned to his home
country. Because of the recent acquisition of jurisdiction over asylum
claims and the revisions of the law in this area in 1980, the Board
characterized the issue as one of first impression.2" The Board further explained:
The language in Section 208(a) specifying the discretionary nature of asy18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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lum relief is clear, and since that section was enacted subsequent to the
1967 Protocol, it controls over any conflicting language in the Protocol
under the applicable rules of statutory interpretation. Consequently, under
the present statute, an otherwise eligible alien who the Attorney General
determines that his life or freedom would be threatened in his native country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is entitled to 243(h) relief and may also be
granted asylum relief, but only as a matter of discretion.2

The withholding remedy was characterized by the Board as "country
specific." Asylum, on the other hand, was characterized as a greater
form of relief which could lead ultimately to permanent resident status in the United States.2 5 While Mr. Salim was protected from deportation to Afghanistan, there was no impediment to prevent his
deportation to Pakistan or any other country that would accept
him.26
Since it had never before considered a discretionary denial of asylum, the Board pointed to the regulation permitting a District Director to deny an asylum request on discretionary grounds "if it is determined that there is an outstanding offer of resettlement by a third
nation where the applicant will not be subject to persecution and the
27
applicants' resettlement in a third nation is in the public interest."
Conceding that the regulation is not binding in the exclusion or deportation context, the Board considered it to be a set of useful guidelines for the exercise of discretion in asylum requests.28
In Salim, the finding of fraud was significant. The Service and the
State Department posited that the "public interest requires that we
do not condone this applicant's attempt to circumvent the orderly
procedures that our government has provided for refugees to immi24. Id. at 314-15 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 315. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1982).
26. The number of possible countries to which the INS may deport an excludable
alien was increased in 1981. Pub. L. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611. The current 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any alien.. . arriving in the United States who is excluded shall be...
deported ... to the country in which the alien boarded the ...
which he arrived in the United States ....

aircraft on

(2) If the government of the country designated in paragraph (1) will not accept the alien into its territory, the alien's deportation shall be directed by the
Attorney General in his discretion and without necessarily giving any priority
or preference because of their order as herein set forth, either to - (A) the
country of which the alien is a subject, citizen, or national; (B) the country in
which he was born; (C) the country in which he has a residence; or (D) any
country which is willing to accept the alien into its territory, if deportation to
any of the foregoing countries is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible.
Cf. U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982) in the deportation context.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(2) (1985).
28. Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 315.
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grate lawfully." 29 It explained:
The fraudulent passport was obtained after the applicant had escaped from
Afghanistan, with the sole purpose of reaching this country ahead of all of
the refugees awaiting their turns abroad. This is not the case where an alien
was forced to resort to fraudulently obtained documentation in order to escape or prevent being returned to the country in which he fears
persecution."

The Board ruled that the "fraudulent avoidance of the orderly refugee procedures that this country has established is an extremely adverse factor which can only be overcome with the most unusual
showing of counterveiling equities." 31 It found no such equities in
Salim, and denied asylum.32 Judicial review was not sought. 33
BOARD DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT To

Salim

Only two reported Board decisions have discussed the discretionary rationale in Salim: In re Shirde 4 and In re McMullen.3 5
Shirdel concerned Afghans who arrived in the United States posing
as transits without visa (TRWOV) aliens using fraudulently obtained Turkish passports and airline tickets issued to others. They
applied for asylum and withholding of deportation. Citing Salim, the
immigration judge found the Afghans excludable on grounds of
fraud and denied them asylum as a matter of discretion. 6
In reviewing the finding of fraud, the Board noted the "question of
what constitutes fraud or material misrepresentation in seeking to

enter the United States as an applicant for asylum is an issue of first
impression. ' 37 The Board found a fraud committed upon the United
29. Id. at 316.
30. Id. (citing In re Ng, 17 I. & N. Dec. 536 (1980)).
31. Id. The Board also noted that alleged cooperation with United States authorities in the investigation of crimes committed in connection with the refugee's entry into
the United States "is not a sufficient significant factor to warrant granting asylum relief
as a matter of discretion." Id.
32. Cf. In re 29 Afghans (EOIR, San Francisco, Aug. 10, 1982) (holding that
asylum should not be denied to the Afghans who had been victimized by "an unscrupulous arranger who [had] preyed upon their desperation" in providing counterfeit travel
documents in India, which had then been used by the Afghans to circumvent the refugee
admission process).
33. The courts have had little occasion to address the proper role of discretion in
asylum. See, e.g., Sarkis v. Sava, 599 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (in view of the
eligibility determination, discretionary denial upheld without extensive discussion and
without addressing the role of discretion in asylum). The Supreme Court has recently
indicated that it is prepared to defer to an exercise of discretion by immigration adjudicators in determining a motion to reopen a deportation decision, at least where the discretionary determination is based on the "particular conduct" of the individual alien.
INS v. Rios-Pineda, 105 S. Ct. 562 (1985).
34. Interim Dec. 2958 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984).
35. Interim Dec. 2967 (BIA May 25, 1984).
36. Excludability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982), for lack of valid travel
documentation, was conceded at the exclusion hearing.
37. Shirdel, Interim Dec. 2958 at 5.

1004

[VOL. 22: 999, 1985]

Discretion in Political Asylum
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

States in the efforts of the Afghans "to arrive in this country by
posing as Turkish citizens.""8
The Board in Shirdel also upheld the judge's discretionary denial

of asylum, explaining and elaborating:
An asylum applicant seeks the favorable exercise of discretion. Consequently, as with all such discretionary applications, an applicant has the
burden to establish that the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.
The critical factor for denying the applications for asylum is that by using
fraudulent passports they improperly bypassed the orderly procedures prescribed for obtaining refugee status abroad. The record reflects that the applicants were sold the airplane tickets and documents which they used to
board an airplane bound for the United States by an organized ring of
smugglers. We have in the past considered it a strong negative factor to
enter the United States with the aid of a professional smuggler because of
the threat it presents to the enforcement of our immigration lawsY9

The Board noted that the State Department BHRHA, in its advisory opinion, recommended denial of the asylum applications based
on policy considerations since the applicants had misused the immigration laws to gain an advantage over all other similarly situated
Afghan refugees who followed established procedures for legally immigrating to the United States.40 The Board reviewed the equities
and found the aliens wanting:
To grant asylum to someone who reaches our shores aided by a
ring of smugglers, after he had already escaped from the country

where he reasonably feared persecution, would only encourage others
to likewise bypass the orderly procedures prescribed for immigrating
,as a refugee. The applicants should not be placed ahead of all the
other similarly situated Afghan refugees. Their only relatives in this
country are other applicants for asylum.4
38. Id. The Board explained:
The applicants clearly intended to enter the United States. This was the ultimate goal. They chose not to wait abroad for a refugee visa. Instead, their first
step for eventually entering this country as refugees was to apply for asylum
when they arrived in the United States on February 5, 1983. They needed to
be physically present in this country in order to submit such an application.
Yet, they could not fly here legally because they did not have visas and were
precluded from obtaining TRWOV status as Afghan nationals. They avoided
the 8 C.F.R. 212.1(a)(3) restriction on TRWOV status for Afghans by fraud.
The four Turkish passports they fraudulently purchased for $8,000 included
airline tickets to the same names listed in the passports. Turkish nationals are
not precluded from obtaining TRWOV statute pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
212.1(a)(3). Posing as Turkish nationals, the applicants were able to apply for
asylum in New York, circumventing the orderly procedures for applying for
refugee status abroad. Id.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 7. The Board further explained:
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The discretionary determination in In re McMullen42 was somewhat more peripheral. That case involved the question of whether a
member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was ineligible for refugee status and withholding of deportation as "one who
has ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person . . . . -4 The Board held that the terrorist activities of the PIRA precluded eligibility and that, in any event, asylum would have been denied as a matter of discretion.44
UNREPORTED BOARD DECISIONS

There have been over sixty unreported Board decisions concerning
the issue of discretionary asylum subsequent to Salim. Sometimes
the Board focused on the manner of entry or attempted entry into
the United States, basing discretionary denial upon a finding of
fraud in gaining or attempting to gain admission. 45 At other times,
the Board premised a discretionary denial of asylum, irrespective of
fraud, on deterring circumvention of the overseas refugee admission
process,"4 despite a recent statement that, in the absence of fraud,
[The refugees'] contention that being denied asylum could result in an unjust
result because the mother and daughter are not in detention and are also applicants for asylum is illogical. If the mother and daughter obtain asylum on their
own in their separate applications, then the applicants could still receive derivative refugee status, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 207.2(e), and subsequent adjustment
of status, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 209.2(a)(3). Consequently, the applicants
would not be unduly prejudiced by their asylum applications having been denied. Id.
The Board also noted that since excludability derived from the second portion of 8
U.S.C. § 11 82(a) (19) (1982), it would not preclude a subsequent entry in an adjustment
application as a derivative refugee. Id.
42. Interim Dec. 2967 (BIA May 25, 1984).
43. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42) (1982) and 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982), and 8
C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iii) (1985).
44. McMullen, Interim Dec. 2967 at 13.
45. See, e.g., In re Oshidari, A23105864 (BIA Dec. 11, 1984) (Iranian found
ineligible for asylum because of failure to show a well-founded fear of persecution); In re
Farenas, A27049509 (BIA Oct. 31, 1984) (Cuban found ineligible for asylum); In re
Escoto, A26414505 (BIA Oct. 4, 1984) (Nicaraguan found ineligible for asylum); In re
Cardozo, A26669493 (BIA Sept. 14, 1984) (Cuban); In re Cherubin, A26189282 (BIA
July 26, 1984) (Haitian); In re Marcelus, A24566687 (BIA June 1, 1984) (Haitian); In
re Amin, A24932215 (BIA May 22, 1984) (Afghan); In re Hamid, A24548430 (BIA
May 8, 1984) (Afghan); In re Hakimi, A26898129 (BIA Mar. 8, 1984) (Afghan); In re
Hakimi, A26172901 (BIA Jan. 19, 1984) (Afghan); In re Alas-Vaquero, A26002656
(BIA Sept. 21, 1983) (Salvadoran); In re Paguaga-Urbina, A26003499 (BIA Jan. 14,
1983) (Nicaraguan).
46. See, e.g., In re Haji, A24520549 (BIA Sept. 25, 1984) ("The mere fact that
the respondent was not found excludable under Section 212(a)(19) of the Act does not
eliminate his circumvention of our immigration laws"); In re Hussain, A26582482 (BIA
Oct. 12, 1983) (lack of fraud finding for Iraqi "not a positive discretionary factor"); In
re Sarwar, A26149766 (BIA Oct. 5, 1983) (absence of fraud finding not determinative
for Afghan); In re Kohyar, A24937657 (BIA Sept. 19, 1983) (no fraud finding); In re
Hamkar, A26144869 (BIA May 24, 1983) (no fraud finding); In re Rahmany,
A26138057 (BIA Apr. 19, 1983) (no "different result" for Afghan for whom there was
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the facts of each case should be evaluated carefully.47 It has also

referred to this second basis for denying asylum as a public policy
consideration.4 In addition, discretionary denials of asylum have
been justified by the belief that refugees have found a "safe haven"
from persecution before coming to the United States.49 Still, at other
times, the Board has denied asylum because of criminal activities in

the United States, 50 or terrorist activities abroad, 5 ' not only as a

matter of eligibility, but also as a discretionary matter.
The exercise of discretion by the Board has been subject to some
self-imposed limitations. In Salim, the Board recognized that the use

of fraudulent
documentation to escape or avoid persecution was not
52
improper.

no fraud finding); In re Hashemi, A26120730 (BIA Apr. 13, 1983) (no fraud finding); In
re Bathija, A26125281 (BIA Mar. 31, 1983) (no fraud finding); In re Hatami,
A26111993 (BIA Jan. 17, 1983) (no fraud finding). Cf. In re Yousafzal, A24925392
(BIA Mar. 20, 1984) (irrelevant that other Afghans in India not following lawful refugee
admission procedures); see also In re Haqiq, A24903452 (BIA Mar. 19, 1984).
47. In re Singh, A27080602 (BIA Sept. 6, 1985).
48. In re Shams, A26152830 (BIA Nov. 4, 1983). See In re Farid, A24932981
(BIA Dec. 19, 1984); In re Nashir, A24069376 (BIA Oct. 18, 1984); In re Mohammadi,
A24224959 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984).
49. See, e.g., In re Nashir A24069376, (Afghan in Pakistan); In re Sarkis,
A24583821 (BIA July 17, 1984) remanded on other grounds (Iraqis in Greece); Sarkis
v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, Sarkis v. Sava, 599 F. Supp. 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also In re Dower, A26187839 (BIA Jan. 10, 1984) (Iranian had
found "relative safety" in Italy); In re Afsharzadeh, A24990191 (BIA Jan. 26, 1984)
([Iranian could have applied for asylum in either Turkey or Spain before coming to the
United States).
The "safe haven" concept is to be distinguished from a finding that the refugee has
"firmly resettled" in a third country, which presumably renders the alien ineligible for
asylum. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(f)(ii) and 208.14 (1985). The INS is considering the issuance
of regulations which specify the achievement elsewhere of protection or the evading of
the overseas refugee admission process as grounds to deny asylum. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17,
1985, § A, at 28, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1985, § A, at 11, col. 3. See also A.
Helton and R. Brauer, Report on Selected Problems in the Asylum Regulations Now
Being Consideredfor Issuance for Public Comment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York 1985).
While it is beyond the scope of this article to compare the law of other nations, it is
significant that the Conseil D'Etat of France in 1981 in the Conte case (1981 Recuell
Dalloz Sirey 250) rejected the concept of "safe haven" in a third country as a ground for
denying asylum, where the individual was not recognized in the third country as having
the "rights and obligations" of a national of that state under the 1951 Convention.
50. See, e.g., In re Campos, A23222413 (BIA Dec. 13, 1984) (smuggling marijuana); In re Downes, A23626802 (BIA Nov. 7, 1984) (smuggling marijuana). Cf. In re
Aquiluz, A21556203 (BIA July 17, 1984) (criminal activities not proven against Philippine national); In re Torrez, A23213038 (BIA Jan. 20, 1984) (robbery).
51. See In re Gallagher, A23694107 (BIA Sept. 1984) (active involvement in
bombing campaigns of the Provisional Irish Republican Army).
52. Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 316.
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Additional limitations were imposed in the unreported decisions.
For example, the Board recognized that asylum should not be denied
if the refugee was in danger in the third country in question,53 although the Board suggested that the evidence of the danger would
have to rise to a level to warrant a grant of withholding of deporta-

tion or exclusion. 4 The Board also suggested that a discretionary
denial would be improper if the refugee did not intentionally avoid
the overseas refugee admission process. 5 5 Further, the Board recognized that it would be inappropriate to deny asylum to a refugee
solely because he had sojourned briefly in a third country on the way
to the United States, 56 or because it might currently be possible to

apply for asylum in another country.57
In evaluating the discretionary determination, the Board identified
close relatives in the United States as a positive factor which can
overcome a discretionary denial.58 Also, the Board has ruled that the

53. See, e.g., In re Betoushana, A26124086 (BIA Nov. 30, 1983) (Iranian's fear
of persecution in Spain held unfounded); In re Azizi, A26144281 (BIA July 22, 1983)
(Afghan's fear of persecution in India held unsubstantiated).
54. See, e.g., Rahimyer, A26962839 (BIA Aug. 1, 1984) (Afghan in India); In re
Mohammadi, A242244959 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984) (Iranian in India failed to prove reasonable possibility of persecution under asylum standard).
55. See, e.g., In re Arsalai, A27037776 (BIA Aug. 28, 1985); In re Sakhah,
A27043010 (BIA Aug. 24, 1984) (Afghans who sought to transit through U.S. with
intent to apply for asylum in Canada did not have intent to circumvent U.S. immigration
laws); In re Oayyum, A24524640 (BIA May 25, 1984) (Afghan's assertion that he was
not permitted by the United States consul to apply for refugee status in Pakistan held
unsubstantiated); In re Afsharzadeh, A24990191 (BIA Jan. 26, 1984) (Iranian's contention that he did not know that he could apply for refugee status at American consulate in
Spain ruled "implausible"); In re Tokhi, A26124051 (BIA Sept. 23, 1983) (testimony of
Afghan that he was refused admission to refugee camp unsubstantiated); In re Sanchez,
A26149724 (BIA Aug. 16, 1983) (innocent use of invalid travel documents would not
warrant discretionary denial); In re Laban, A26144877 (BIA June 7, 1983) (discretionary denial of asylum reversed for a Syrian family with transit visas who had been paroled
into the Untied States when the father became ill). Cf. In re Channa, A26124010 (BIA
Mar. 31, 1983) (issue not whether refugee knew about overseas admission process where
"an organized ring of smugglers" is involved).
56. In re Mehrbakush, A26144255 (BIA Aug. 4, 1983) (refugee's "brief sojourn
[of approximately one month] in Turkey was merely incidental to his flight from Iran to
the United States").
57. In re Vahedi, A22993391 (BIA Sept. 14, 1984) (immaterial that Iranian who
had uncle in Germany might be able to apply for asylum there).
58. See, e.g., In re Nasery, A24088152 (BIA Nov. 6, 1984) (discretionary denial
overcome on motion to reopen showing that alien's parents and five siblings had been
granted refugee status, and that two other brothers were asylum applicants); In re Eskandari, A26189240 (BIA May 23, 1984) (having a mother who is an asylum applicant
and brother who is non-immigrant student in the United States does not constitute "outstanding equities" required to overcome a discretionary denial); In re Rahmany,
A26138057 (discretionary denial upheld as the alien had but "a lawful permanent resident cousin and two brothers who were also applicants for asylum"); In re Muktarzada,
A26105762 (BIA Mar. 31, 1983) (motion to reopen granted and appeal remanded because the refugee's son and grandson had been granted asylum by the District Director.
"These grants of asylum substantially raised the weight of the applicant's equities in this
country, as well as raised the possibility of inconsistent results under similar
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basis for a discretionary denial of asylum must be set forth in the
decision of the immigration judge, or must be clearly reflected in the
administrative record. 59
THE LIMITS OF DISCRETION

The refugees who have been denied asylum under the rationale of
Salim and its progeny are either returned to their countries or
granted withholding of deportation or exclusion. Withholding has
been granted in these circumstances to numerous Afghans and Iranians. Absent a grant of asylum, they cannot become permanent residents or citizens, they can never petition to have close family members join them in the United States, and they cannot travel abroad
without jeopardizing their status. Further, should a country ever
agree to accept them, they could be immediately deported.6 0 Thus, in
view of the grave consequences that can attend a discretionary de-

nial, an examination of the limits of administrative discretion is
appropriate.
In the immigration area, administrative discretion is broad, but
not unlimited. As in other areas, it is circumscribed by statute,61 and
sometimes even by Constitution 62 or international law.6 3 Discretion
must be exercised with all relevant positive and negative factors
taken into account.6 4 Discretion may be abused if its exercise was:
[m]ade without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested upon an impermissible basis, such as an invidious
discrimination against a particular race or group, or, in Judge Learned
Hand's words, on other "considerations that Congress could not have incircumstances").
59. See, e.g., In re Tusell, A22183204 (BIA Jan. 11, 1984); In re Azizi,
A26144281 (BIA July 22, 1983); In re Ghahrmanloo, A26127562 (BIA April 19, 1983).
See also In re Rahmani, A22599707 (BIA April 21, 1983) (conditional grant of asylum
and withholding of deportation overruled in view of absence of authority for any such
remedy under the Refugee Act).
60. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1159(b), 1227 and 1253 (1982).
61. See Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134
(1936) (agency action which is inconsistent with statute is void).
62. It has been said that certain arriving or "excludable" aliens have no constitutional rights with respect to admission to the United States. See U.S. ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Even these aliens, however, may be the beneficiaries
of constitutional protections created by statutory and regulatory entitlements. Augustin
v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
63. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2489, 2500-01 n.22. In In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), the Board determined that a discretionary denial of asylum to an
applicant who had been convicted of burglary was unauthorized by the regulations as
interpreted and defined by the Protocol.
64. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 813 (2d ed. 1979).
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tended to make relevant." 6

How exercises of discretion in the asylum area fare under these principles must be examined.
DOMESTIC LAW

The concept of discretionary asylum is new and its contours have
not yet been fully developed. It is clear, however, that a primary
underlying principle is one of policy - the perceived need to maintain the integrity of the overseas refugee admission process. This approach would appear to be at odds with the humanitarian purpose of
the Refugee Act of 1980 - to establish ideologically-neutral and
uniform standards upon which to measure claims for asylum based
on the evidence presented in each individual case.6
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 to create a more humane and effective procedure for dealing with refugees and to bring
this country into compliance with its obligations under international
law. 67 The Immigration and Nationality Act now provides a statutory right to petition the government for asylum. It directs the Attorney General to establish a procedure for an alien "physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective
of such alien's status" to apply for asylum. 68 Even an alien who has
been found otherwise excludable or deportable is entitled to apply
for asylum.
The legislative history of the Refugee Act indicates that Congress
intended the amendments to create a humane refugee procedure and
to bring the United States in line with the United Nations Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees.6 9 The House Report states that it
considered the inclusion of an asylum provision "both necessary and
desirable" in order to insure a fair and workable asylum policy. This
would be consistent with the United States' tradition of welcoming
the oppressed of other nations and with its international
obligations."0
An alien is entitled to seek asylum irrespective of fraud in entering
or attempting to gain entry in the United States.71 The proper ques65. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966) (suspension of
deportation). See also Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982) (release on parole).
66. Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983). See 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(42)(A), 1158 (1982). See also S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
125 CONG. REc. 23, 231 (1979); Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 2816 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) at 27.
67. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1979).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
69. Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 101(a) (1979).
70. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1979).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982) (alien eligible to apply for asylum "irrespective of
1010

Discretion in Political Asylum

[VOL. 22: 999, 1985]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tion is whether the individual has been persecuted or has a wellfounded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, not
whether a grant of asylum might have adverse policy consequences.
An over-broad use of discretion, particularly involving factors "that
Congress could not have intended to make relevant," would violate
the Refugee Act. Similarly, a categorical rejection of asylum claims
for those who have come to the United States in an irregular fashion
would violate not only the Refugee Act, but also administrative law
principles which mandate individualized justice.
Furthermore, the policy justification advanced in support of the
doctrine of discretionary asylum - the maintenance of the overseas
admission process - simply does not withstand scrutiny. The refugee situation in Afghanistan, for example, is one of mammoth proportions; over three million Afghan refugees have fled into Pakistan
and India.7 2 In 1985, however, under the Refugee Act annual consultation process, only 5,000 admission places
were allocated to the
73
area where Afghan refugees are located.
In any event, absent a realistic opportunity for asylum seekers to
avail themselves of the overseas refugee admission process, or even to
learn about its existence, then its circumvention would clearly be a
misnomer. A description of the admission process for Afghans in Pakistan and India provides a useful illustration.
THE REFUGEE ADMISSION PROCESS

The first step in the refugee admission process is the fixing of admission ceilings of refugees by geographical area. This is done each
year through consultation between the President and the Judiciary
Committees of both Houses of Congress.74 For fiscal year 1985, a
ceiling of 5,000 was allocated to the Near East and South Asia,
which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.7 5 Actual admissions, however, are much lower. Only 2,698 Afghans, for example,
were resettled as refugees in the United States in 1983, despite a
[immigration] status"). See United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980)
(illegal manner of arrival did not diminish lawful entitlement to seek asylum).
72. Department of State, Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation:Statistics, 20 (July 1984) [hereinafter "Refugee Reports"].

73.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Proposed Refugee Admis-

sions and Allocations for Fiscal Year 1985, 33 [hereinafter "Refugee Admissions"].
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982).

75. See Refugee Admissions, supra note 73.
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comparably high ceiling.76
Since the established ceilings were insufficient to resettle all the

refugees, a priority system has been developed. In order to be eligible
for the United States refugee program, an applicant must meet the
priority ratings currently accepted by the United States.1 For the

Near East and South Asia, the numbers allocated are few. Consequently, applications by Afghans are accepted only if they qualify
for the first four of six priorities. 78 Generally, this means that if the
refugee does not have strong family or prior employment links with
the United States, then he or she may not even be eligible for
admission.
The first processing step is a pre-screening in the area by an
American joint voluntary agency staff or the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In the case of Afghans in
Pakistan or India, the voluntary agencies pre-screen the refugees and
determine whether they are within the four categories accepted by
the U.S. Employees of the State Department. The agencies then re-

view the files and confirm the priority classifications of the refu76. Refugee Reports, supra note 72, at 32. The comparable report on proposed
refugee admissions for 1983 shows a ceiling of 6,000 numbers allocated to the Near East
and South Asia.
77. Refugee Admissions, supra note 73, at 36-38.
78. Cables from the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Islamabad, Pakistan, and New Delhi, India, copies of which are in files of the
author. The priorities are the following:
I. Compelling Concern/Interest: exceptional cases; (a) of refugees in immediate danger of loss of life and for whom there appears to be no alternative to
resettlement in the United States, or (b) of refugees of compelling concern to
the United States, such as former or present political prisoners and dissidents.
2. Former U.S. Government Employees: refugees employed by the U.S. government for at least one year prior to the claim for refugee status. This category also includes persons who were not official U.S. government employees,
but who for at least one year were so integrated into U.S. government offices as
to have been in effect and appearance U.S. government employees.
3. Family Reunification: refugees who are spouses, sons, daughters, parents,
grandparents, unmarried siblings, or unmarried minor grandchildren of persons
in the United States. (The status of the anchor relative in the United States
must be one of the following: U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident alien,
refugee, or asylee).
4. Other Ties to the United States: (a) refugees employed by U.S. foundations,
U.S. voluntary agencies, or U.S. business firms for at least one year prior to the
claim for refugee status; and (b) refugees trained in the United States or
abroad under U.S. government auspices.
5. Additional Family Reunification: refugees who are married siblings, unmarried grandchildren who have reach their majority, or married grandchildren of
persons in the United States; also more distantly related individuals who are
part of the family group and dependent on the family for support. (The status
of the anchor relative in the United States must be one of the following: U.S.
citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, refugee, or asylee.)
6. Otherwise of National Interest: other refugees in specified regional groups
whose admission is in the national interest.
Refugee Admissions, supra note 73, at 37-38.
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gees.7 9 The interview takes place at the agency office. There is an
interview waiting list, and if the applicant is not within the first four
categories, then he or she may not even be permitted to fill out an
application. s0
The applicant is thereafter interviewed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to determine whether he or she is a "refugee"
as defined by law, and whether the person is admissible to the
United States, subject to medical clearances and sponsorship agreements. 81 The INS' determinations as to refugee status and overall
admissibility are final. The criteria to be used by INS officers are
outlined in written guidelines.8 2
Refugees who do not fall within the first four categories are effectively precluded from participating in the admissions process. Under
these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to preclude them from
receiving asylum merely because of these general priorities. While it
may be permissible to consider various factors unrelated to the actual refugee situation in setting ceilings in the overseas refugee admission process,8 3 such factors appear inappropriate when considered
in the context of individual asylum adjudications under the statutory
scheme.
In any event, domestic law is not the only limiting principle. International law also provides limits to the role of discretion in asylum.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Generally, under customary international law, individuals are not
considered to have a right to be granted political asylum.84 On the
other hand, individuals are generally considered to have a right to
non-refoulement, under international law, that is, to not be returned
to a territory where he or she would face persecution. 5 One noted
commentator has stated that individuals have a right under international law to temporary refuge in a country until a reliable determi79. Id. at 38-39.
80. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1983, at A19, col. 1.
81. Refugee Admissions, supra note 73, at 38-39.
82. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Worldwide Guidelines for Overseas
Refugee Processing,3, 7-24 (1983).

83. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1982).
84. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 121-23 (Oxford 1983). Customary international law is a body of normative standards derived from
the practices of countries, sometimes reflected in various international instruments. See
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
85. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 84, at 97-100.
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nation can be made respecting refoulement.86
This same scheme of entitlements is prescribed by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States

acceded in 1968.87 The Protocol is silent on the right of an individual
to be granted asylum. Article 33 of the Protocol, however, prohibits
the return of a refugee in "any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion." 88 Article 31 of the Protocol, moreover,
provides that only necessary restrictions may be placed on the movements of refugees unlawfully in the country until such time as they
regularize their status or gain admission into another country.8 9 This
implies a right to temporary refuge pending a determination under
article 33.
The concept of discretionary asylum, however, seems to survive
scrutiny under these principles of general international or treaty law.
The withholding remedy can be applied in a manner congruent with
the non-refoulement obligation.9" The statutory scheme in the
United States, furthermore, generally provides that aliens may remain in the United States pending a decision on a withholding
claim. 91
International law, however, may provide some limits on the exercise of discretion in the asylum area. Discretionary limits apply particularly where principles favoring family reunification are
threatened by refugees separated from close family members located
abroad. 2
86. Id. at 74-78.
87. The Protocol was opened for signature on January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. It was ratified by the United States on October 4,
1968. 114 CONG. REc. 19, 607 (1968). The Protocol incorporated the pertinent aspects
of the refugee definition in article 1 and articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees. 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
88. Article 33(1) of the Protocol.
89. Article 31(2) of the Protocol.
90. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. In unreported decisions, the
Board has found the discretionary denial of asylum not to violate the refugee Convention
and Protocol. See, e.g., In re Omar, A24934789 (BIA Apr. 16, 1984).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1225-27 and 1252-53 (1982). See Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under
the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MicHa J. L. REF. 243, 254-56
(1984) (a discussion of the major exception to this rule - the Haitian interdiction
program).
92. A domestic law analogue exists in the context of the provision for waivers of
the use of fraudulent documentation in the deportation context. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
This section allows the Attorney General, in his discretion, to waive deportability based
on a finding of excludability for fraud or misrepresentation if the alien is thespouse,
parent, or child of a citizen or of a permanent resident. This waiver of deportation provisions grew out of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009, to deal with the
problem of refugees who lied about their homelands to avoid repatriation to communist
countries. See generally INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966). Such misrepresentations,
although widely felt to be justifiable, made the refugees excludable from the United
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FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Protection of the family has been recognized for some years as a
proper goal of international law, and particularly of refugee law. A
number of the major documents of international law contain references to the family.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights9 3 states that, "the

family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." The International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights94 and the American Conven-

tion on Human Rights9" track this language. The International Cov-

enant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights96 expands on the
concept, stating that "[t]he widest possible protection and assistance

should be accorded to the family, and expresses particular concern
for the establishment of the family and the care of dependent chil9

dren. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man

7

States. Sympathy for the refugees inspired proposals for statutory reform, including a
provision in the House version of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The
Conference Committee deleted the section, but in its report, stated the expectation that
the fraud provisions of the Act would be applied in accordance with "fair humanitarian
standards" and not be used to exclude these refugees. H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82nd Cong.,
2d Sess. 128 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1754. In 1957,
the Act was amended to provide for waiver of deportation of some aliens who entered
fraudulently. To qualify for waiver, the alien had to be either the spouse, parent, or child
of a citizen or a permanent resident alien and otherwise admissible at the time of entry,
or a refugee who entered between 1945 and 1954. The latter class of aliens had to prove
that their misrepresentation was made to avoid persecution and that it was not made to
avoid quota restrictions or to foreclose investigation. This provision, which had been codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a), was repealed in 1961 as having served its purpose, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 657, and was replaced by a section substantially similar to the
present section, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f). See Errico, 385 U.S. at 220-24. In holding that
waiver of deportation was available to an otherwise qualified alien whose fraud constituted an evasion of quota restrictions, the Court construed the various Acts as reflecting
the Congressional policy that "it was more important to unite families and preserve family ties than it was to enforce strictly the quota limitations or even the many restrictive
sections that are designed to keep undesirable or harmful aliens out of the country."
Errico, 385 U.S. at 220. The Court further noted that any doubt as to the proper construction of the statute should be resolved in favor of the alien. Errico,385 U.S. at 225.
A similar construction would seem to be appropriate under international law.
93. Article 16(3). Approved by Resolution 217 A (III) of the General Assembly,
Dec. 10, 1948. 3 (pt.1) GAOR, Resolutions (A/810), at 71-77.
94. Article 23(1). Adopted by Resolution 2200(XXI) of the General Assembly,
Dec. 16, 1966. GAOR, XII, Supp. No. 16, (A/6316), at 52-58.
95. Article 17(1). Signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969. OAS Treaty Series, No. 36, at 121 (OAS Official Records, OEA/SER.A/16, English).
96. Article 10(1). Adopted by Resolution 2200 (XXI) of the General Assembly,
Dec. 16, 1966. 21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, (A/6316), at 49-52.
97. Resolution XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of Ameri1015

states in article VI that "[e]very person has the right to establish a
family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection
therefore."
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms98 is even more specific:
I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home

and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a

democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,

for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.9

There is a fairly substantial body of decisional law from the European Commission interpreting this provision. While applicants claim
denial of rights in varied contexts, most applications involve attempts
to block the deportation of a person on the ground that it would
interfere with family life. In nearly all of these cases, the Commission reiterates the principle that the Convention does not guarantee
an alien the right to enter or reside in a particular country, or the
right not to be expelled from a particular country. 100 The Commission does, however, recognize that exclusion or deportation of a person from a country where his close relatives live can constitute an
interference with family life. A prohibition of entry into a country
where family members are living, however, will be considered an interference with family life only if the family life is firmly established
in the territory concerned. 10 1 When a person is expelled from a country, the possibility of his family following him to his destination is a
relevant consideration. 102 Even if the family is unable to follow, expulsion may be justified on the grounds of public safety or the prevention of disorder where the person expelled has committed a serious crime.103 Under the European Convention, a country may deport
a parent, even though it will result in the de facto deportation of
can States, held at Bogota, Columbia, March 30 - May 2, 1948. Pan American Union,
Final Act of the Ninth Conference of American States 38-45 (Washington, D.C., 1948).
98. Signed at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950; entered into force Sept. 3, 1953. Council of
Europe, European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Texts, Section 1, Doc. 1 (7th
ed. Strasbourg, 1971).
99. Article 8 of the Convention.
100. See, e.g., Application No. 8041/77, 12 European Commission on Human
Rights Decisions and Reports 197 [reporter hereinafter cited as Decisions].
101. See Application Nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, 9 Decisions 57 (denying a father
permission to visit his illegitimate children not an interference when he has never lived
with them in the country concerned and when it is possible for them to meet elsewhere).
102. See Application No. 9478/81, 27 Decisions 243; Application No. 6357/73, 1
Decisions 77.
103. See Application No. 8041/77, 12 Decisions 197; compare Application No.
6357/73, 1 Decisions 77 (interference with family life not justified where person has not
committed a serious offense).
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minor children who are citizens by birth of the deporting country,
where the deportation of the parent is justified by the policy of maintaining public order through the enforcement of the immigration
04
laws.1
The Final Act of the Helsinki ConferenceS" contains detailed provisions dealing with family unification under the Human Contacts
section (Basket III). The State parties to the Act pledge to "deal in
a positive and humanitarian spirit" with petitions for reunification of
families. The Concluding Document of the Madrid Conference
strengthened this language to read "favorably deal with" and "decide upon" such applications. The Madrid Conference also committed the participants to decide on applications within six months, and
to refrain from imposing punitive sanctions on people applying for
family reunification. 10 6 The family reunification provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act, however, have been utilized exclusively to allow
people to leave a particular country to join family members living
elsewhere, rather than to allow people to enter a particular country
to join family members living there.
Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has given particular attention in recent years to the problem of family reunification. A section dealing with family reunification has appeared in the Reports of the High Commissioner since
1971. The policy of the High Commissioner's office was guided by
the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. While the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees developed by the Conference contains no language directly applicable to the problem of
family reunification, the Conference adopted a Final Act which
strongly recommends that governments take action to protect the
unity of refugee families.
In 1981, in response to the problem of the boat people, the Executive Committee of UNHCR adopted a number of conclusions on the
reunification of separated refugee families. Included in the recommendations of the committee are provisions encouraging asylum
countries to apply "liberal criteria" in identifying family members to
be admitted and to grant family members the same legal status as

104. Application No. 8245/78, 24 Decisions 98.
105. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1, 1975, at 305.
106. See Joint Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Review Meeting (Committee Print 1983).
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the head of the family who was designated a refugee.1"7
While there are no specific treaty provisions involving the principles favoring family reunification which bind the United States, the
general principle has achieved the status of a norm under customary
international law.108 This is established by state practice as reflected
in the international instruments already discussed. A precise application to the situation of immigration parolees, however, is less clear.
To the extent that the concept of discretionary asylum results in barring the reunification of family members, it runs afoul of this general
principle.109
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES -

REFUGEES IN ORBIT

The concept of discretionary asylum recently spawned a bizarre
development. Since October of 1983, the INS has attempted to deport numerous Afghan and Iranian refugees to countries through
which they had travelled on their way to the United States, such as
Pakistan or India, in cases in which asylum was denied as a matter
of discretion. This was done by placing the refugees unescorted on
air carriers headed to the countries in question. But since these countries ordinarily will not accept aliens without valid travel documents,
the refugees faced the possibility of being flown back and forth between the United States and the refusing country, conceivably in
perpetual motion.110
The most celebrated case to date involved two Iranian refugees
who were ordered deported and sent by the INS in October 1983 to
Spain. Spanish immigration officials refused to accept them and immediately returned them to the United States. The INS immediately
sent them back to Spain, which again refused them entry and returned them to the United States. They were scheduled for a third
attempted deportation when a federal court intervened."1
107. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report of the Executive
Committee, U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add. 1 (1981). See also the 1979 Report of the High
Commissioner, expressing particular concern for family reunification and describing it as
"imperative" and "a factor of major importance" in dealing with the refugee problem.
Report of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/34/12
(1979).
108. See Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1382.
109. Article 31 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which prohibits
imposing penalties upon and unnecessarily restricting the movements of refugees, also
may be implicated to the extent that family reunification and travel abroad are
precluded.
110. See, e.g., Khugiani v. Sava, CV. 84-0939 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). This was a
habeas corpus petition which challenged the method of deportation planned for an Afghan refugee. The petition was dismissed on April 1, 1984. Over twenty individuals have
been subjected to this method of attempted deportation.
11. Sedgh v. Sava, 83 Misc. Civ. 436 (ED.N.Y. 1983). The case involved a federal habeas challenge to review the execution of the deportation order. It was settled by
an arrangement for refugee processing in a third country.
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The Europeans, partly because of the proximity of state borders,
have had more experience with this situation. 112 Finding a bit of humor in an otherwise macabre situation, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has termed the phenomenon
"refugees in orbit." 1 3
In some cases, the consequences may even be more drastic. Sometimes, refusing countries have sent refugees on to their home countries, where all parties concede that they will face persecution.', 4
CONCLUSION

The recent phenomenon of discretionary asylum raises new issues
about the proper role of discretion in the asylum area, and the appropriate interface with domestic and international law. The discretionary doctrine may be invoked with greater frequency and in more
varied circumstances in the future. This injection of discretion into
the asylum standard, however, threatens to swallow the right to apply for asylum in the United States.
Moreover, the consequences flowing from the denials may be bizarre, such as the launching of refugees into perpetual motion, or
dangerous, such as creating the risk of refoulement to countries of
112.

G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 84, at 52-56.
113. Refugees, Sept. 1983, at 1, col. 1. "Refugees" is a periodical published by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
114. See G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 84, at 55. See also Khugiani, CV. 840939 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). While it is somewhat beyond the scope of this article, an exclusion would not appear to be "practicable or proper" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) if attempted with no reasonable expectation that the person would be accepted abroad, or in
the face of a reasonable possibility that he or she would ultimately be returned to their
home country to face persecution. Both statute 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) and article 33 of the
Protocol prohibit the return of refugees to territories where they would face persecution.
While the courts ordinarily hesitate to intrude into the manner of a deportation planned
by the Service, see, e.g., Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and U.S. ex
rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), af/d., 274 F.2d 667
(2d Cir. 1960), there would seem to be a good basis for a challenge under such circumstances. Indeed, amendments to the exclusion statute in 1981 that were designed to track
the deportation statute would appear to require a presentation in these circumstances to
the proposed country of deportation prior to an effort to enforce departure. See H. REP.
No. 97-264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1981); S. REP. No. 859, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 127 CONG. REc. 10503, 10507 (1981). See also U.S. ex rel. Tom Man v.
Murff, 264 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1959).
Those whose departure cannot be enforced can be released on indefinite "parole" in

the United States. See the guidelines set forth at 60

INTERPRETER RELEASES

536-37

(1983). As discussed previously, however, such "parole" does not lead to permanent residence, permit family reunification, or allow travel abroad. Further, should travel facilities
ever be obtained, persons with such a status could be immediately deported. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1153, 1159(b), 1227 (1982).
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persecution. Initiation of litigation to avoid the application of the discretionary standard or to resist its expansion and consequences is inevitable. The exercises of discretion in denying asylum, and the results that flow therefrom, will be measured against constitutional,
statutory and international law entitlements. These principles will be
invoked in order to safeguard the right of asylum.
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